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Many analysts, journalists, and diplomats--the last often speaking on an unattributed basis--have been
citing a huge error in the current quest for peace between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority
and between Israel and Syria and Lebanon. (Some rather view the peace quest as among the four
entities given their de facto independence, even if Lebanon largely functions as a dependent surrogate
or vassal of Syria.) The huge error supposedly is Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's declaration that
important agreements on the peace quest must be finalized, or be close to finalization, within 15
months.
There are at least two significant rationales for viewing the declaration as error. First, a deadline allows
negotiating powers to not even attempt serious negotiation until the deadline is drawing nigh. Second,
the deadline becomes a tripwire of failure for its declarer--leading to pressures to accept positions not in
the interest of security but of not failing to reach an agreement.
In opposition to opponents of deadline, one might well posit that a deadline impedes a negotiating
power from merely stringing others along and marking time. A deadline--through the setting down of a
marker--also can demonstrate the resolve and good faith of the deadline's creator and facilitate
negotiation.
In fact, a history of peace negotiations among various nation-states and political entities surely suggests
that deadlines may or may not contribute to successful resolution of Issues. As with decisions on clarity
and ambiguity on how specific Issues are even conceptualized and phrased, a general stance on always
favoring or opposing deadlines becomes yet another set of ideological blinders with which negotiating
participants are already burdened and from which they must try to break free.
The correct stance on the 15-month deadline is to recognize the threats and opportunities it entails and
then to proceed towards the peace of the brave. (See Druckman, D. (1997). Dimensions of international
negotiations: Structures, processes, and outcomes. Group Decision and Negotiation, 6, 395-420;
National security policy and toleration for ambiguity: Israel, Northern Ireland, North Korea, and the
World. (September 4, 1998). IBPP, 5(10); Ghosh, D. (1996). Nonstrategic delay in bargaining: An
experimental investigation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 67, 312-325; Ochs,
E., & Jacoby, S. (1997). Down to the wire: The cultural clock of physicists and the discourse of consensus.
Language in Society, 26, 479-505; The deployment of ground forces to Kosovo: A paean for ambiguity.
(February 5, 1999). IBPP, 6(5); Safire, W. (July 22, 1999). The cherubic commando. The New York Times,
p. A21.) (Keywords: Israel, Lebanon, Middle East, Palestine, Peace Negotiations, Security, Syria.)
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